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Abstract: This reflection seeks to elaborate on the social nature of the individual. The 
social self, or “nos”, is the social part of the structural theory of personality. The 
superego becomes part of nos and also part of the ego. Most of our problems come from 
childhood, from the unhealthy influence of our parents. We carry their effects in our 
superego. From nos we can see the superego as a sick agent and work with the problems 
imbedded there as they appear in the group. It is concluded that we need both nos and 
ego in order to understand human reality. My ego is only mine, but my nos belongs to us. 
The various institutions of the social structure are all so many forms of nos, and provide so 
many social mirrors for people who participate in them. The various kinds of social 
consciousness intertwine, because the same individual belongs to many social units. Thus, 
a person has many social self images. 
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In the past, people variously talked about instinct, drive, or motivation; since 
studying the human genome, we can talk about the psychological effects of genes. 
Freud (1940a) thought it is important to include a drive theory in psychoanalysis 
because he wanted a psychology that systematically contains a relationship to the 
body. For him, the body was not an afterthought, but an essential part of the 
human picture with its reflexes and evolutionary aspect. In psychoanalysis, drive 
has been the “interface”, to use a modern expression, between body and mind. 
They were of course aware of the difficulties. Philosophers have been asking and 
leaving basically unanswered the body-mind question for centuries. The 
psychoanalysts and group analysts did not intend to give final answers. They 
looked for a tool. A practitioner cannot wait until all questions are resolved. The 
patients keep coming every day, and the work has to be done as best we can. 
If we approach the problem from its practical side, we can then ask: how 
could we understand any problem relating to the body or being in the world, 
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without a drive theory? We may attempt an answer by referring to symbols, but 
then we need to understand how symbols work? Any answer to that question would 
need to include something about energy that makes sense in terms of the psyche, 
as well as of the body. We need to understand what happens when we have a 
thought or a feeling and a part of the body is moved by it. Those who try to do 
psychoanalysis without drives may still want to use words like “libido” or “feeling” 
or “affect” in such a way that it implies some kind of driving force. 
Freud made a structural theory of the personality of id, ego, and superego. 
In Freudian terms, id is the instinctual part we are born with, conscience is the 
ego’s relationship to the superego, and a feeling of guilt means fear of 
punishment. The ego tries to get away with what it can, and the superego dictates 
the limits.   
Adding a genuine social function to the structure of personality makes a 
fundamental difference (Ormay 2012). The idea of two basic drives emerged in the 
1960s: the old one initiates self centred acts and the new one makes us social. The 
self centred drive has been attributed to Darwin (1871), and makes us experience 
reality from a personal point of view, and as we grow up, the personal ego 
develops. With the help of the recently discovered social drive or social instinct, 
we can complete the psychoanalytic structural theory of the personality by adding 
a genuine social function that develops from an inherited biological base. It 
enables us to experience reality from a social viewpoint, as we share, do things 
together, and belong to various groups. We might call such a genuine social 
function “nos”, Latin for “we”. Both the ego and nos begin to develop after we 
are born. The baby observers (Stern 1973) discovered that we display social 
responses from the beginning of life.  The new personality structure comprises the 
id, ego, and nos. The superego remains as a part of the ego, and a bridge towards 
nos, because the parents teach us civilization, which is the content of society. The 
superego’s basically dictatorial role is reduced by the genuine social function. 
 Language is the product of social life, so reflective consciousness is nos, and 
a large part of our biological processes is unconscious and form the biological base 
of the social unconscious. This is the area where we give meaning to the internal 
representations of the external world according to social norms, where we may 
observe the past, judge the possible future, where we live not only in the present 
moment. Reflective consciousness was called narcissistic consciousness by Freud 
(1914), because we relate to ourselves in it. So long as reflective consciousness 
helps our relating to the world, it is healthy, but when too much energy is bound 
up in it, at the expense of object relating, we call it pathological narcissism. The 
recently discovered mirroring neurons (Iaccoboni, 2008) are of particular 
importance to the social side of our personality. They provide biological 
foundation to the group analytic function of mirroring. With the help of mirroring 
neurons, we experience ourselves reflected by our environment. The baby will see 
itself reflected in mother’s eyes, in the Winnicottian (1964) baby-mother unit. 
Up to the 19th century, we were surrounded by animals. We travelled on 
horse’s back, the cart was drawn by oxen etc. In such an environment, we 
experienced our animal nature reflected. We find evidence for it in the arts of the 
age, where passion and strong feelings provided the dynamics. In the present 
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times, we are surrounded by machines, and as a result we increasingly see 
ourselves as machines. The scientific picture of human beings and modern arts are 
clear evidence. Interestingly, enough long before the discovery of the mirroring 
neurons Plato wrote in the Alcibiades that the best mirror for a human being is 
another human being. The mirror neurons do their reflective function by firing 
when we act, and firing also when we observe or experience action similar to our 
own. A similar act is not an identical act, similarity means the same type. When I 
do a helpful act, the mirroring neuron fires, when I observe or experience a 
helpful act the mirroring neuron fires again, enabling me to recognise the same 
kind of act, the same type of act. It means that mirror neurons operate on the 
social level, where we classify acts according to our social types, like good acts, 
fearful acts, funny acts etc. 
During the years of becoming social, the child needs the guidance of the 
super-ego, while she does not understand, she needs to be told. But as she grows 
up and the social side of her personality develops, the super ego takes a back seat. 
The socialising process is accompanied with a feeling of renunciation that comes 
with anxiety, because we loose the security of the dictator who told us how things 
were, and what to do in various situations. Classical psychoanalysis got as far as 
replacing the cruel dictator with a benign dictator in the transference, but it is 
not enough for growing up. As Ferenczi (1933) wrote:   
 
Parents and adults, in the same way as we analysts, ought to learn 
to be constantly aware that behind the submissiveness or even the 
adoration, just as behind the transference of love, of our children, 
patients and pupils, there lies hidden an ardent desire to get rid of 
this oppressive love. (pp. 164) 
 
A grown up person is master of himself or herself, and says: “I am going to 
decide what I want to do.” We need nos for that sort of development, because it 
enables us to understand our various social relationships, for example at our work 
place, or in the family, or in any group.  
Once we got over the anxiety caused by the vanishing role of the superego, 
we experience great relief, because the superego carries many problems. When 
we internalise our parents and guardians, we also take in their personalities, 
mental problems, and social misunderstandings, which are the source of many 
neuroses. If we care to develop our nos, we shall manage our social life much 
better, than our parents ever did. With our nos we understand that cooperation 
and our existence in the community is to the advantage of all of us. Such 
recognition fills us with a joy of liberation, while a lack of cooperation makes us 
feel empty and alienated, with other words, social guilt. The fulfilled joy or the 
guilt of nos is different from the personal satisfaction or fear of punishment of the 
ego. Belonging to the family, and the various social groups gives us a positive 
experience in nos. It tells us that we are all in one, of course not in the space-
time meaning of the word, but in a social sense. The “oppressive love” of the 
superego is replaced by the liberating love of nos. 
It is important to point out that the superego will never disappear, because 
nobody ever grows up completely, and in as much as we remain children, we 
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retain the personality structure of the child. But the direction of psychic 
development is dictated by the social function of nos. Our parents are our source 
of love in our childhood. As we grow up, we necessarily distance ourselves from 
them. Object relations theories tell us that we have to internalise our parents and 
thus carry that source of love inside. Indeed, the ego is capable of much 
internalisation, but it can only do some of the job of holding onto love. If we try to 
find all our love by internalising love objects, we overload the ego and create a 
narcissistic culture. Much of the love we have is provided by us, as we love each 
other, not in an internalised world, but in the real social world. The Buddha said: 
 
Love each other, because you do not have your mother and your 
father any more to love you. 
 
Trying to understand human relationships, Freud had to explain them with 
the ego. He had to say, that when I relate to any object, I relate to its internal 
representation. I cathect internal representations, I displace one internal 
representation with another, and so on. If we try to understand how we relate by 
using a theory based on the ego, we cannot understand how we get from internal 
representation into the social world. If we only have the ego, we can never get 
out. 
The problem deepened later on with object relations theories, because they 
put the emphasis on relating, but they only have the ego, therefore they are stuck 
with inner objects. On the other hand, if we are concerned only with the external 
social world, we never get in, and that is the problem of socio therapy. Both the 
ego and nos are needed, if we want a more complete structural theory to explain 
human relationships. 
Sociology is concerned with the social conscious, but the social unconscious 
also has an extended literature by now. Foulkes (1957) used the term, Malcolm 
Pines (1983), Tom Ormay (1991), Earl Hopper (1997; 2001), and Farhad Dalal 
(1998) amongst others, have written on the subject.  
We may look at a person from many sides, and depending or our view point 
we get a different picture. On the side of the ego, we find the person, as the 
personal self, which is private. Classical psychoanalysis has furnished us with such 
a view point. If we look at a person from the side of nos, as it is discussed here, 
we find the social self, as a member of its community. Social images of the self 
come about when the person recognises himself or herself in the various social 
formations as in so many mirrors. As history went by, the individual dimly 
recognised that he belonged to various groups: the family, a tribe, humanity, 
living beings, the universe. 
The conscious side of our social life is gradually unfolding in our everyday 
life, but most of our social life has been unconscious. I do not think of the social 
unconscious as a giant ghost floating over us. We are all one in the life of society 
and the various groups. That unity does not have a body, but it is real, and in as 
much as we do not know, it happens unconsciously. Nos is the social reality we live 
in. We create it together by contributing our own bit to it in our social life. This 
reality is not the material kind, but equally real and effective. I am a member of 
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my family, the same family my brother is a member of, and so are my parents. We 
made that family together, it would not exist without us. I say this family is my 
family, my brother says it is his family. At same time it is our family. This is nos 
and participation. We find such relationships if we look at how the parts form a 
whole. Wittgenstein (1967) generally called it ‘family relationship’. 
From the ego’s point of view it seems contradictory that I say it is mine, my 
brother says it is his, at the same time it belongs to both of us, and to our parents 
as well. The ego would find it difficult to understand. But we grew up in families, 
so we know that there is no contradiction here, this is belonging. My nos is at the 
same time my brother’s nos, and also our nos. The ego protests, because its job is 
to do so, it distinguishes between us, it makes the point, that what is mine, is not 
yours, and vice versa. 
I think we need both to understand human reality. My ego is only mine, but 
my nos belongs to us. The various institutions of the social structure are all so 
many forms of nos, and provide so many social mirrors for people who participate 
in them. The various kinds of social consciousness intertwine, because the same 
individual belongs to many social units. Thus, the same person appears many times 
in the various social mirrors. George Herbert Mead (1956), the American 
pragmatist and social scientist, talked about a person having many social selves. I 
would put it slightly differently by saying that a person has many social self 
images. 
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